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THE DECISIONS WE ARE (OR ARE NOT) FREE TO
MAKE, FOR NOW
Laura Schauer Ives*

My father and I would walk the block of my childhood home every night
after dinner. Every night, we would stop to talk with Jim. Likely younger than I am
now, he was vibrant, a health enthusiast before health enthusiasts were common, and
the lovely but rare adult who was actually present for children. He listened and
seriously engaged with everyone around him. I liked him very much.
Though my dad and I continued our walks, we stopped seeing Jim. I had
overheard my parents vaguely mention “Lou Gehrig’s.” But I was ten, and it meant
nothing until I saw Jim one last time. He was out in front of his home. This time,
propped on both sides by caregivers. He was skeletal—his muscles severely
wasted—and unable to walk or speak without assistance. We made eye-contact. He
looked desperate. I have since seen many people before they have died, some of them
at the end stage of disease, but I have never again seen a person in as grave of a
condition as Jim.
As my dad and I walked away, I asked my dad what was going to happen
to Jim. I knew, of course. One could not see a man so ravaged and not know, even
as a child. The same wasting we could see on Jim’s face and body, my dad explained,
was overtaking his organs as well. He would die soon. He, in fact, did die soon,
within the week.
When I got home, I went to my room and wept. It was the first time I recall
weeping for someone else, but as is always the case when we confront death, I also
wept for my own mortality and fear of it. I did not want to die like Jim. Others may
have seen Jim and thought him closer to God; others may have thought they would
pursue the ends of the earth to find a cure. Still others, like me, would have seen Jim
and thought they would do anything they could to avoid a prolonged and brutal dying
process. The particulars of the varied reactions would, of course, be as different as
the individuals themselves. Those differences and, more importantly, the ability to
act on those differences make us free.
There are some decisions so personal, so central to how we define self and
existence, that they should be spared from majority edict. It is the judiciary’s
exclusive province to decree those choices that are beyond majority reach, the
choices best left to the individual, informed by their most deeply held values, beliefs,

* Laura Schauer Ives is a partner at Kennedy, Kennedy, and Ives, in Albuquerque, New Mexico,
where she exclusively practices civil rights law. She was the past Legal Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union of New Mexico, where her litigation included the constitutionality of prohibiting samesex marriage in Griego v. Oliver, 2014-NMSC-003, 316 P.3d 865, the constitutionality of halving
veterans’ separation pay who had been discharged under Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, and Morris v.
Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d 836, the subject of this essay.
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and unique circumstances. In Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, 376 P.3d
836, I argued1 to the New Mexico Supreme Court that, under the happiness and due
process clauses of the New Mexico Constitution,2 the decision of a terminally-ill,
competent adult to end their suffering by taking a medication that would hasten their
death should be one such decision. The Court disagreed. It did so despite being
provided with the only trial record ever created that unequivocally established: (i)
the intimate nature of the decision at issue, (ii) the safety of the practice, which is
governed by a standard of care, and (iii) that the practice benefits, rather than harms,
end-of-life care in general. 3
In the New Mexico Supreme Court’s Opinion finding a right to same-sex
marriage under the New Mexico Constitution, Justice Chavez wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to
life, liberty, and property . . . and other fundamental rights may not
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.4
Still, wisdom on how to make a principled determination of which subjects
should be impervious to a tallied raising of hands is as varied as people’s core beliefs
are. This is the nature of substantive due process rights: they are nebulous, but they
are also the essence of our freedom and the only protection we have against giving
up too much in the social contract, and courts have struggled to define them. This is
what Plaintiffs faced in Morris.

1. Endless thanks to my co-counsel, Kathryn Tucker and Alexandra Freedman-Smith, who tried the
case with me in front of Judge Nan Nash of New Mexico’s Second Judicial District and were with me on
the briefs in the New Mexico Court of Appeals and the New Mexico Supreme Court. Though we
ultimately lost, physician aid in dying was legal in Bernalillo County while the State of New Mexico
appealed Judge Nash’s decision, it will always be one of the most important cases that I have tried, and I
am fortunate to have pursued it with dear friends. Additional thanks to my law partners, Joe and Shannon
Kennedy, who gave and give full support to my continued and uncompensated pursuit of this right even
though I am no longer with the ACLU of New Mexico. And thanks to Adam Flores, my associate at
Kennedy, Kennedy, and Ives, and former judicial clerk to Judge Linda Vanzi, who authored the Dissent
in Morris v. Brandenburg, 2015-NMCA-100, 356 P.3d 564, the Court of Appeals Opinion overturning
Judge Nash, who has patiently entertained more than anyone’s fair share of my thoughts on this issue and
helped formulate what to say about it here.
2. N.M. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 18.
3. In finding the criminal prohibition of assisted suicide unconstitutional as applied to aid in dying,
Judge Nan Nash, the district court judge who heard all the evidence presented at trial, ultimately
concluded:
This Court cannot envision a right more fundamental, more private or more integral to
the liberty, safety and happiness of a New Mexican than the right of a competent,
terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying. If decisions made in the shadow of one’s
imminent death regarding how they and their loved ones will face that death are not
fundamental and at the core of these constitutional guarantees, [then] what decisions
are?
Morris v. Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV 2012-02909, 2014 WL 10672986, at *7 (2d Jud. Dist. Ct. N.M.
Jan. 13, 2014).
4. Griego, 2014-NMSC-003, ¶ 1 (quoting W. Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
638 (1943)).
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Twenty years ago, in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), the
majority of the United States Supreme Court had already refused to recognize the
right to aid in dying by narrowing the issue before it and refusing to find a
constitutionally protected right to suicide (not aid in dying) because it has not been
long and historically protected. In that case, however, the Court did not have
evidence of the open practice of aid in dying in front of it, and a majority of justices
reserved judgment on whether aid in dying may be protected by the federal
constitution in the future.5 In addition, the Court has since rejected Glucksberg’s
historically bound substantive due process analysis, embracing the constitution as a
living document that is not temporally fixed.6
To overcome Glucksberg, the Morris Plaintiffs created the singular
evidentiary record concerning practice of aid in dying ever established in the U.S.
We pointed to the change in the United States Supreme Court’s approach to
substantive due process. And, we argued, even if the United States Supreme Court
would not see Plaintiffs’ claims differently seventeen years later, the New Mexico
Supreme Court should.7 But in an amalgamation of the most onerous federal burdens
for plaintiffs seeking the shelter of our founders’ guarantee of due process, the New
Mexico Supreme Court denied our claims under the state constitution, refusing to
depart from Glucksberg.
Federal courts have never been comfortable defining or limiting rights
protected by the abstract doctrine of substantive due process. Two dominant
approaches have emerged. The first, and more ridiculous approach, recasts an

5. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); see also Kathryn L. Tucker, A Nadir of
State Constitutional Jurisprudence: Failing to Protect Terminally Ill Patients’ Choice for a More Peaceful
Death In New Mexico, 48 N.M. L. REV. 315 (2018). It is encouraging, yet confounding, that a right can
gain “fundamental” status with time. A “fundamental” right, as it has developed, is essentially a right that
a Court is willing to recognize and afford the strictest of a court’s scrutiny to predictable outcome:
protection. Arguably, however, it would have been more intellectually honest to acknowledge the plain
fundamental nature of a decision like how we die while simultaneously finding that in this rare instance,
and in absence of evidence related to a current practice, the state has credibly demonstrated its significant
interest in preventing the practice.
6. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). The concurring Glucksberg minority,
advocating for rejection of a rigid historical analysis of substantive due process rights, has prevailed
subsequent to that decision. See id. The Court most recently made this plain in Obergefell, where in the
context of same-sex marriage, the Court rejected a constitutional approach bound to historical recognition
of a right, holding that “[t]he identification and protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the
judicial duty to interpret the Constitution.” Id. at 2598. In so doing, a court’s duty cannot be “reduced to
any formula.” Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Instead,
courts must “exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the
State must accord them its respect.” Id. Though history informs that inquiry, it does “not set its outer
boundaries,” allowing us to learn from it without the past dictating the present. Id.
7. New Mexico courts do not follow federal analysis of parallel constitutional provisions in lockstep. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 20, 932 P.2d 1. Instead, “New Mexico courts independently
analyze ‘state constitutional guarantees when federal law begins to encroach on the sanctity of those
guarantees.’” State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 19, 142 P.3d 933 (quoting State v. Gutierrez, 1993NMSC-062, ¶ 32, 863 P.2d 1052). Examples of cause to diverge from federal precedent include “a flawed
federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state
characteristics.” New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 28, 975 P.2d 841
(quoting Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19).
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asserted right at its most specific level.8 The recast right is then held up against the
Nation’s history and legal tradition to determine whether it is “deeply rooted” therein
and should enjoy constitutional protection.9
This is a rights-killing methodology that contravenes principles of analogy
and distinction that are the essence of judicial decision-making. Applying this
approach, for example, a plea to the courts to protect a familial or parental
relationship, undoubtedly worthy of some protection from majority decree,10 can be
reduced to a level of abstraction that finds no precedent: an asserted right of
unmarried fathers vis-á-vis children whose mothers are married to other men.11 An
assertion that a state has no business criminalizing private consensual intimate
conduct in the home can be analyzed pejoratively by the courts as an asserted right
“to engage in homosexual sodomy.”12 And the right to determine the time and
manner of one’s death13 can become an asserted “right to commit suicide,” and to
demand a doctor’s assistance in doing so.14 Almost inevitably, such specificallyrecast rights are never deeply rooted in the Nation’s history or legal tradition, else
they would already be protected by custom or statute, which would negate the need
to bring the constitutional challenge in the first place. When a court chooses to apply
this approach, it chooses to reject the plaintiff’s claim.
The second, and currently prevailing, approach to substantive due process
is a reaction against the strict historical analysis. In essence, the judiciary preempts
the legislature in enacting social change by responding to recent changes in public
opinion about the asserted right. For example, when there became an “emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how
to conduct their private lives in manners pertaining to sex[,]”—who knew?—the
United States Supreme Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick and recognized a
fundamental right to the same conduct that was politically unpopular when Bowers
was decided.15 And, more recently, the Supreme Court found a fundamental right to
same sex marriage by following a path marked by changing attitudes, recently
enacted state laws, and recently decided judicial opinions of state supreme courts and
the lower federal courts favoring the right at issue.16
This “sea change” approach to constitutional law has its own problems. The
judiciary is often criticized as a political institution staffed by unelected judges
legislating from the bench. Judicial opinions resorting to public opinion are
obviously subject to attack on that ground and on the related ground that the courts,

8. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989).
9. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
10. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (right of father to have custody of child born
out of wedlock).
11. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n.6.
12. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
13. See Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1999).
14. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
15. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72.
16. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015).
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acting as a sort of super-legislature, are prematurely killing the ongoing public
debate.17
But there is a more fundamental concern. By biding its time until the tide
turns on politically unpopular rights-claims, the courts are abdicating their duty to
“withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of public controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts.”18 Courts are not legislatures, and they’re not
institutionally equipped to gauge public opinion; nor is it desirable that they do so.
It is axiomatic that “fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend
on the outcome of no elections.”19 In fact, the greater the public’s animus toward
particular groups or activities, the riper the case for constitutional review. In short,
the rights asserted in cases like Bowers, Glucksberg, and Obergefell have always
been fundamental, not because they’ve become (or may become) politically safe to
protect, but for the opposite reason: the plaintiffs in these cases were subject to an
invidious, democratically-sanctioned injustice that rejected their attempts at selfdefinition at every turn and without any legitimate reason for doing so. Sea change
or not, the courts have a duty to step in.
Unfortunately, elements of both federal approaches are evident in our own
supreme court’s review of physician aid in dying. The Court referred both to
historical attitudes toward aid in dying, which, unlike marriage, had no “tradition to
fall back on[,]”20 and to the ongoing debate in state legislatures, unearthing only a
“minor but growing trend”—rather than a sea change—recognizing the right through
legislation.21 At bottom, the Court was reluctant to intrude into an area, end-of-life
medical care, which had no significant national consensus and which had been staked
out over the years by a statutory scheme that protected certain forms of palliative
care while criminalizing aid in dying.22
For the reasons discussed earlier, I believe both dominant federal
approaches are flawed when applied by the United States Supreme Court. It’s even
worse when state courts, applying their state constitutions, rely too heavily on the
Nation’s history or on an irrelevant national consensus. Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, which has to account for the fact that its constitutional rulings may
affect the laws of fifty states, our state supreme court has far less reason to concern
itself with practices nationwide. This is not to say that the experiences and lessons
from aid in dying in states where it’s legal are not helpful. They are. They provide
tremendous insight into developing standards of care that are necessary to keep the
practice safe, and they are useful for evaluating the legitimacy of the state’s asserted
concerns. However, in the basic determination of whether a right is a “fundamental”
according to state law, our state supreme court is not well served when it proceeds
lockstep with a Court that is primarily concerned with the balance of power between
federal and state governments in a federalist system.23
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Id.
Morris v. Brandenburg, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 33.
Id. ¶ 5.
See id. ¶ 56.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735–36 (1997).
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To be sure, the Morris Court briefly noted that it “might quarrel with the
emphasis placed on history and tradition by the Glucksberg Court[,]”24 but that was
the extent of it, and the details of any such quarrel were never made express. This
effectively left Plaintiffs’ claim unresolved. If the United States Supreme Court’s
emphasis on history and tradition in Glucksberg was flawed, it would be absurd to
follow it, and our interstitial approach to state constitutional review would justify
departing from the federal precedent.25
Perhaps the strongest justification for departing from Glucksberg can be
found in Glucksberg itself. By its own terms, the opinion was not intended to
foreclose states from reconsidering the legality of aid in dying.26 The Court expressly
addressed only the particular challenge before it, and left open “the possibility that
an individual plaintiff seeking to hasten her death, or a doctor whose assistance was
sought, could prevail in a more particularized challenge[.]”27 Thus, the Plaintiffs in
Morris, who included a doctor and a dying a patient, did something that had not been
previously been done. They created a record that specifically refuted all of the
countervailing government interests that had been asserted in Glucksberg, including
an unfounded slippery slope which alleged that providing physician aid in dying
would inevitably lead to child euthanasia and the glorification of teenage suicide.
Still, the Morris Court declined to depart from Glucksberg, citing only to the same
statutes criminalizing the same conduct that the Court was asked to review.28
The inescapable conclusion is that there is no “more particularized” claim
to aid in dying that can succeed in the New Mexico courts. That does not mean that
the fight is over by any means. All efforts must be directed at the Legislature, or
perhaps at building a national consensus significant enough for our supreme court to
take notice. Those are the only options that remain for those trapped in an unbearable
dying process in New Mexico.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 34.
See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d 1.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735.
Id. at 735 n.24 (quoting id. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
See Morris, 2016-NMSC-027, ¶ 57.

